We report an experimental study that aims to elicit monetary measures of strength of preference in choices involving pairs of risky prospects. Despite extensive testing to refine the instruments used, we find that these money measures are systematically biased upwards relative to subsequent binary choices. We discuss possible reasons for this bias and its broader implications. [56 words] JEL classification: D81, C91.
I. Introduction
This paper investigates the possibility of eliciting accurate monetary measures of strength of preference using incentive-compatible experimental methods.
The ability to judge the strength of preference (SoP) for one item over another, measured in money units, is central to microeconomics, and is often assumed to be a routine part of economic behaviour. For example, manufacturers of durable goods such as cars, television sets, computers, etc. customarily produce a range of products with different levels of quality and different prices and let consumers judge whether the quality differences are more or less valuable to them than the price differentials.
While this kind of market transaction is attractive because individuals are observed when making decisions in real-world settings under real monetary incentives, it often does not provide sufficiently detailed information to accurately measure SoP. In many instances, an individual's dichotomous decision as to whether or not to buy a product with a given level of quality is all that can be observed. By using laboratory experiments, we can overcome this limitation of field data, and at the same time try to devise an incentive system that induces individuals to accurately report their SoP judgments on a money scale. However, as we shall see, many individuals do not seem to find it straightforward to make this kind of judgment without systematic biases -at least, not in the realm we investigate.
Our focus is upon the elicitation of money differentials between the kinds of simple lotteries that are widely used in experimental studies of decision making under risk. The objective of many of these studies was to discriminate between alternative theoretical models, a task that SoP measures have the potential to facilitate. In their review of deterministic and probabilistic theories, Luce and Suppes (1965) wrote: ". . . the intuitive idea of representing the strength of preference in terms of a numerical utility function -in terms of a subjective scale -is much too appealing to be abruptly dropped. Indeed, no-one has yet dropped it at all; every theory that we examine includes such a notion . . ." (p. 332-3).
The most commonly used technique in studies of decision-making under risk is binary choice between lotteries. This is partly because the binary preference relation is widely taken to be the fundamental building block of decision theory. And it is partly because the binary choice task is easily understood by participants in experiments and can be related simply and directly to monetary incentives: if participants are paid according to the outcome of the lottery they have chosen, they stand to benefit most by reporting their preferences carefully and accurately. However, if the theories under study entail substantial overlapping between the sets of decisions that they allow, binary choices alone may be somewhat blunt instruments: as in the case of field data, dichotomous responses provide only limited information, especially when the range of choices presented to a sample of respondents has to be broad enough to span the considerable heterogeneity between individuals.
In an attempt to deal with this limitation, some studies have asked each participant to make a large number of choices and have then used econometric methods to try to reach a view about which theory provides the best fit to each individual's decisions: for an example of such an attempt, see Hey and Orme (1994) . While this approach may be regarded as in the mainstream economic tradition, it has several drawbacks -not least, the demands it may make on each participant in terms of the volume of responses, and its sensitivity to different assumptions about functional form and stochastic specification (see, for example, Wilcox 2008 , Blavatskyy and Pogrebna 2010 , and Bardsley et al. 2010 ).
An alternative approach is to supplement basic choice data with more direct information about the degree to which one alternative is judged better than the other -a difference which we refer to as subjective SoP. In decision analysis, it has also been common to elicit subjective SoP judgments (e.g., von Winterfeld and Edwards, 1986) , when use of a monetary scale is impractical. In recent research (Butler et al. 2012 (Butler et al. , 2014 , some of us have built on earlier work (see also Mellers and Biagini 1994; Birnbaum et al. 1999 ) to explore the extent to which SoP judgments expressed in verbal and/or Likert scale form might provide additional insights into the structure of preferences. We found the SoP distributions to respond clearly and in the expected direction to changes in both the payoffs and the probabilities of the choice options, allowing us to detect systematic tendencies in people's underlying preferences even when their observed choices did not change.
In this paper, we report the results of the last of a series of experiments in which we tried to elicit monetary measures of strength of preference -henceforth MSoP. Relative to their subjective counterparts, such measures are appealing for a number of reasons. First, a monetary scale has a clearly defined zero and unit of measurement, which allows clear comparisons between pairs of options in the same way as a cardinal utility scale does.
Second, MSoP can be more readily compared across individuals. Third, it can be linked to a standard incentive-compatible mechanism. If MSoP could be elicited accurately, a strong case could be made to include MSoP as a useful addition to the economists' toolkit.
Unfortunately, despite our best attempts to develop and refine the MSoP instrument, we encountered some difficulties which could not be resolved. We do not yet have a fullyformed explanation for the regularities we found, but since they appear to challenge assumptions about people's ability to express their SoP for one item over another in money terms, they raise questions which merit further investigation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the mechanism we used to elicit MSoP and the logic of our tests designed to detect systematic biases in MSoP judgments. In Section 3, we present our experimental design and key results.
In Section 4, we discuss various candidate explanations for our findings and their possible wider implications.
II. Incentive-compatible elicitation of monetary strength of preference
Our aim was to elicit the amount of money that expresses how strongly an individual prefers lottery A over lottery B: that is, we sought to identify the amount of money that needs to be added to each consequence of the less preferred lottery to make it exactly as attractive as the preferred lottery. This approach has been advocated, for example, in the influential book on decision analysis 'Smart Decisions' (Hammond et al, 1999) in which it was called the 'even swap'. It is more direct and arguably less prone to 'noise' or error than comparing two separately elicited certainty equivalences and avoids the possible complications associated with the 'preference reversal' phenomenon (see Seidl, 2002) .
In this paper, we confine our attention to pairs of lotteries which between them involve no more than three monetary payoffs a > b > c ≥ 0, although, as noted in the previous section, the assumption that individuals can make MSoP judgments is quite general in the way economists model preferences.
Let lottery A offer payoff a with probability p and payoff c with probability 1 -p, We now turn to the question of how m* might be elicited in a way that is incentivecompatible. At this point we focus on the general principle and leave detailed issues of implementation until we describe the experimental design.
For each pair of lotteries, {A, B}, the procedure involves two stages. First, the individual is asked to choose which of A or B she prefers. Then she is asked to state the amount of money that would need to be added to each consequence of the non-chosen lottery 1 to make it as attractive to her as the lottery she initially chose. Once a pair in the experiment is selected to be paid for real (only one decision is played out for real), the individual flips a coin to determine whether she will be paid on the basis of playing out the lottery she chose in the first stage or whether she will be paid according to her second stage MSoP response.
In the latter case, we use a variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism (henceforth BDM). The individual blindly draws a sum of money -the random amount -by picking one envelope from a set of opaque envelopes, each of which contains a different sum. The distribution of these amounts is unknown to the individual. If the random amount is less than or equal to her stated MSoP, she gets to play the lottery she chose in the first stage, because according to her MSoP response the random amount is too small to alter her decision. If the random amount is larger, she gets to play the modified lottery obtained by adding the random amount to the lottery she did not choose originally, because according to her MSoP response, the addition of the random amount to the unchosen lottery now constitutes a new lottery that is preferable to the one she chose initially.
Lotteries are played out by drawing one of 100 numbered discs from an opaque bag.
The payoff associated with each number can be clearly identified by looking at the lottery display. An example of the display for a lottery which pays £10 with 50% probability (numbers 1 to 50) and £8 with 50% probability (numbers 51 to 100) is given in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 about here
Conditional on the participant choosing her preferred lottery, this procedure is incentive compatible in the same sense as the standard BDM. Misreporting her 'true' MSoP will make the individual worse off whenever the random amount falls between her true and stated MSoP. If this is a result of understating her true MSoP, she gets to play a modified lottery which is inferior to her chosen lottery. If it is a result of overstating, she fails to play a superior modified lottery and plays her originally chosen lottery instead.
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It might be argued that this is more complicated than the standard BDM, and may invite some strategic behaviour. For example, some individuals might try to end up with a better outcome in the MSoP task by choosing the less preferred lottery in the first stage and then stating the minimum m (zero) as their MSoP. The thinking behind such a strategy is as follows. Suppose an individual truly prefers A to B and her true MSoP is m*. However, she believes that the average value of the random amount -call this r -is greater than m*. She therefore supposes that if she misreports that she prefers B to A and states an MSoP close to zero, there is a 0.5 chance that she will be paid according to her first-stage choice response and have to play B rather than A (thereby being worse off by m*); but there is a 0.5 chance that she will be paid according to her second-stage response and play A enhanced by the random amount, which on average takes the value r. If she believes r is greater than m*, it may seem that this strategy will on average make her better off. Although this reasoning is flawed, we aimed to pre-empt any such behaviour by telling participants (truthfully) that the set of envelopes from which the random amount was drawn contained an equal number of negative and positive amounts (with zero as the middle value). This meant that even if they stated an MSoP close to zero, they would be paid according to their first-stage choice every time a negative random amount was drawn. In other words, misreporting one's choice would result in the individual playing out her less preferred lottery at least 75% of the time and they would have to believe r to be very much higher than m* (in spite of the middle value of the distribution of random amounts being zero) in order to suppose that this risk could be offset by misreporting their preference.
Moreover, we can check the data to see whether such sophisticated strategic misreporting is a genuine issue. Remember that, in order to maximise her chances of benefiting from choosing the less-preferred lottery, the individual must state the minimum possible amount in the MSoP task (which is zero in all cases). Thus, the number of individuals who state an MSoP of exactly zero provides an upper bound on the number of strategically biased responses (an MSoP of zero is also the answer that we would expect from an individual who is indifferent, or who realises that he chose the less preferred option by mistake and wants to minimise the potential loss).
An essential part of the development of our MSoP instrument consists in devising a method for evaluating its performance. In this paper, we do this by comparing a participant's MSoP judgment to her subsequent choices in pairs constructed by adding a predetermined positive amount (i.e. independent of her stated MSoP) to the lottery she had not chosen in the initial stage. If MSoP judgments are unbiased, they should on average be consistent with the choices made in these subsequent tasks. We decided to use two values for each pair in order to get some feel for the magnitude of the observed overstating or understating. So someone who chooses A in the first stage will later be presented not only with {A, B + m 1 } but also with {A, B + m 2 }, where m 1 < m 2 , with these choices being separated by a number of others to reduce the chance that respondents would make any connection between them.
III. The Experiment

Design
The experiment was divided into two parts.
In part 1, every participant completed four different tasks for each of 20 pairs of lotteries constructed on the basis of some of the most common regularities in choice under risk. For each pair, participants were asked to choose one of the lotteries, state their confidence in their choice, report an SoP judgment on a (non-incentivised) Likert scale, and state their MSoP. While these four tasks were always faced in the same order, the order of the pairs was determined at random for each participant. to each of the consequences of the lotteries that were not chosen in part 1. The order in which the resulting 40 pairs were presented was randomised independently for each participant, subject to the constraint that the first 20 should contain 10 small increments and 10 large increments, and similarly for the last 20 pairs. As explained in the previous Section, these pairs are designed to detect any systematic distortions in MSoP judgments.
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In designing our experiment, we took a number of steps to give our MSoP instrument the best chances to succeed -that is, to provide us with monetary measures of strength of preference in line with the stakes involved in the various lotteries that we used. These steps were informed by extensive piloting. Before this main laboratory study, we conducted two smaller pilots (with 44 and 40 participants respectively), followed by a larger online pilot study (with 252 participants) in which we only elicited choices and MSoP. More details on these pilot studies can be found in the online Appendix.
Learning from these pilot studies, we developed an MSoP instrument that allowed participants to visualise the implications of their MSoP judgment before they confirmed their
decision. An individual entered his/her MSoP by pressing 'Up' and 'Down' buttons, which were shown next to the non-chosen lottery, to adjust all payoffs of the non-chosen lottery in 10 pence increments until the respondent judged the resulting lottery to be 'equally desirable' as the lottery that was initially chosen. 5 A screenshot of the MSoP task is shown in Figure 2 .
Figure 2 about here
We refined the explanation of the MSoP incentive mechanism to be as clear as we could make it. To this end, we went through two examples that illustrated why it is optimal to state one's MSoP as accurately as possible and why misreporting one's MSoP could result in suboptimal outcomes.
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We also wanted to reduce the likelihood that any systematic overstatement of MSoP was due to lack of familiarity with the task. Therefore, we only invited to the main laboratory study those participants who had participated in the online study and who had thereby had experience with a number of MSoP elicitation tasks.
The lottery pairs
The 20 lottery pairs used in the experiment are reported in Table 1 . For each pair, the table reports the pair label, the parameters of the two lotteries, and the two amounts, m 1 and m 2 , that were added to each consequence of the non-chosen lottery in the second part of the experiment. The 20 pairs are divided into two subsets: four first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) pairs, shown in the top panel of Table 1 , and sixteen 'safe-risky' (SR) pairs, shown in the bottom panel. Table 1 These tasks provide a simple but crucial test. The remaining sixteen pairs are named safe-risky (SR) pairs because they all feature a relatively safe lottery and a relatively risky lottery, where the latter always has greater expected value (EV). For all these pairs, m 1 equals £2 and m 2 equals £4. By contrast with the FOSD questions, in the SR pairs either lottery can legitimately be chosen given particular risk attitudes, but the range over which the MSoP can be expressed without violating FOSD varies considerably depending on which lottery is chosen. Therefore, these pairs allow us to see whether MSoP behaves systematically differently in a variety of situations.
Results
The 113 participants were University of Warwick students recruited from the Decision
Research at Warwick (DR@W) database. 8 They all had previous experience with the MSoP task in the large online pilot study. In order to make our tests as stringent and conservative as possible, we will restrict our analysis to the 89 participants who always respected FOSD in the four questions designed to detect violations. 9 The average sum received by participants was £12.61, ranging from a low of zero to a high of £62.70.
she stated an MSoP of exactly £1.40. Then, the lottery resulting from adding this amount to both consequences of the dominated lottery would be (£36.40, 0.35; £1.40, 0.65) which is as good as the chosen lottery when both pay £36.40, and strictly better when the new lottery pays £1.40 instead of nothing.
8 At the time of the experiment this was a customised version of the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004 ).
9 For these 89 participants, there is only one instance in which the stated MSoP violates dominance in the remaining sixteen pairs (one participant did so in pair SR16). Of the 24 excluded participants, 22 never chose the dominated option in the four FOSD pairs, but stated an MSoP value that entailed a violation of dominance (6 individuals did so once, 15 twice and 1 three times); 1 individual chose the dominated option once but did not violate FOSD in his/her four MSoP statements; and 1 individual chose the dominated option twice and violated FOSD in all four MSoP statements. The exclusion of these participants is meant to make our tests as conservative as possible. Had these participants been included in our analysis, the patterns we observe would have been even more pronounced.
Before we turn to the main results, we briefly consider the issue of strategic misreporting mentioned in Section 2. As we explained, the number of participants who state an MSoP of exactly zero provides an upper bound for the number of times the less-preferred lottery might have been chosen in part 1 in order to receive an improved preferred lottery in part 2. Out of the 1424 responses (16 for each of the 89 participants in the SR pairs), only two (that is, 0.14%) were exactly zero. Strategic misreporting must then have occurred between zero and two times and is thus not an issue in the data.
The experimental results are reported in Table 2 for the FOSD pairs and Table 3 for the SR pairs. We begin with the FOSD pairs.
Table 2 about here
The top panel of Table 2 shows, for each of the four FOSD pairs, the parameters of the dominated and dominating lotteries, the money increment that was used to obtain the dominating lottery, the EV difference (favouring the dominating lottery), the number of individuals who violated dominance in the initial choice, and the number of individuals who, having initially chosen the dominating option, went on to state an MSoP that entailed a violation of FOSD.
The last two rows of the top panel show that, while it is quite rare for participants to violate dominance in a straight choice between two lotteries (even in the disjoint displays in which the dominance relation is less obvious), it is not uncommon for them to state an MSoP that entails a FOSD violation, especially for the pairs with the small money increment (mo1.40 and md1.40). As we explained in the previous section, we use this information to restrict our sample to the 89 participants who did not commit any of these types of violations.
This makes our tests particularly conservative so that the MSoP elicitation is given the best chance to succeed.
The second panel of and participants who switched too late (i.e. did not switch for an amount strictly greater than their stated MSoP), as explained in Section 2.
The picture that emerges from Table 2 is unmistakeable. In all eight comparisons, the proportion of early switches is significantly greater than that of late switches (at the 1% level in five, at the 5% level in two cases and at the 10% level in one), indicating that the stated MSoP does not in fact make the participant indifferent between the chosen and improved lottery, but rather that the improved lottery often tends to be chosen even when the improvement is strictly less than the stated MSoP. The tasks with the large increment (mo10 and md10) are particularly indicative in this respect, because the £2 and the £4 happen to split the sample asymmetrically in opposite directions (as the median MSoP is £3 and £3.50 respectively). This shows that the tendency for overstatement is a robust feature of these data.
Next we consider the results for the SR pairs, presented in Table 3 . Table 3 about here
The structure of Table 3 is similar to that of Table 2 . In the first panel, we show the safe and risky lottery of each pair, and the EV difference favouring the risky lottery. The second panel reports summaries of MSoP for individuals who chose the safe lottery. That is, it shows how much money would need to be added to the risky lottery to make it as desirable as the chosen safe lottery. Panel two also indicates how many of the 89 individuals chose each lottery, and reports the upper bound for MSoP: that is, the lowest MSoP amount that entails a violation of dominance. The third panel is analogous to the second, except it refers to individuals who chose the risky lottery rather than the safe lottery. The final two panels report our statistical tests, in the same format as in Table 2 . However, splitting the sample according to whether the safe or the risky lottery was initially chosen sometimes means that we do not have enough observations for our statistical tests. This is indicated by a † symbol.
The mean and median MSoP responses often appear to be quite different for safe and risky choices. This seems to be particularly the case for the pairs in which there is a great disparity between the ranges over which MSoP can be expressed. For instance, the difference in MSoP values is substantial in pairs SR4 and SR5, in which the upper bound for MSoP is £5 for participants who choose safe and £55 for participants who choose risky. A similar pattern can be found in pair SR1, with upper bounds of £30 and £10 for safe and risky respectively (but interestingly not in pairs SR2 and SR3, which have the same bounds), in pairs SR9 and SR15, with upper bounds of £9 and £36, and in pairs SR10 and SR14, with upper bounds of £15 and £30. These asymmetries suggest that the trends we observe in our MSoP data may be influenced by the differences between the larger payoffs of the two lotteries. We will come back to this issue in the discussion.
Our statistical tests, reported in the last two panels of Table 3 , give a general picture that is quite consistent with our findings for the FOSD pairs. There are 64 possible comparisons (four for each of the 16 SR pairs). In 5 cases, the low number of observations does not allow us to conduct a meaningful statistical test. Out of the remaining 59 cases, we find a significant result in the usual direction in 41 cases (at the 1% level in 32 cases, at the 5% level in 4 and at the 10% level in the remaining 5 cases), no significance in 16 cases and a significant result in the opposite direction in just 2.
So in the great majority of cases we observe early switches outnumbering late switches, consistent with a tendency for MSoP to be overstated. This is true even for the people who state an MSoP exactly equal to £2 or £4. Summing over the sixteen SR pairs, these equalities happen in 261 cases. In 234 (89.7%) of these, the participant switches when offered the corresponding added amount (either £2 or £4). Under the null hypothesis that a participant who states an MSoP exactly equal to the added amount is as likely to switch as she is to stick to the originally chosen lottery, the likelihood of this happening by chance is virtually zero. This is further evidence of a strong tendency for the MSoP measures to be overstated.
IV. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we have reported an experiment designed to elicit measures of strength of preference in units of money (MSoP). The idea that people can judge the amount of money that compensates for a difference in quality or subjective value between different options is fundamental to standard economic analysis. The substantial bias that we discovered suggests that things are not so straightforward. Recall that our elicitation instrument and the explanation of the incentive system were refined through extensive piloting; that all our participants were required to have previous experience with the task; and that we restricted our analysis to the most consistent individuals. In other words, we endeavoured to give the MSoP elicitation procedure the best chance to succeed that we could devise. Despite this, the outcome of our battery of tests is unequivocal: there is a pervasive tendency for MSoP to be overstated.
In the remainder of this Section, we speculate on the possible causes of this systematic distortion and offer suggestions for future research.
One possible explanation is that we are encountering some form of 'endowment effect' (e.g. Thaler, 1980; Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman et al., 1990) . By asking the participant to make an initial choice, we may privilege the initially-chosen option. The MSoP task may then be interpreted as a 'willingness to accept' task by the participant, which has a tendency to exceed the corresponding 'willingness to pay' valuation. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we did try to frame our instructions neutrally in that respect, by asking participants to report 'how much money would have to be added to the lottery [they] didn't choose to make it exactly as desirable as the one [they] did choose'. We did not refer to the BDM sum as a 'price' but as a 'random amount'. And in the feedback we received from our questionnaires in the pilot studies, this notion of selling the chosen lottery back to the experimenter was never mentioned. But we cannot rule out the possibility that some interpreted their MSoP as a compensation for accepting the less desired lottery in the pair.
A somewhat different explanation is that the overstatement of MSoP is caused by a form of post-decision 'consolidation' or 'bolstering' (e.g. Svenson et al. 2009 ) or perhaps some element of confirmation bias or reduction of dissonance (Festinger, 1957) . The argument goes as follows. The MSoP judgment was made soon after one of the lotteries had been chosen. Since making a choice requires the participant to identify the differences between the two options, the large values of MSoP that we observe may be a consequence of us asking the question at the moment in which the two lotteries feel most different to the subject (i.e. bolstering is at its strongest). Moreover, a larger MSoP also affirms, and is consonant with, the correctness of the choice just made. By this account, we should observe less of an overstatement if we asked the two questions at different times during the experiment -a possibility that might be examined in future work.
A third possibility, suggested to us during an informal debriefing of participants, is that the overstatement of MSoP is due to some kind of overweighting of the non-zero payoffs while paying insufficient attention to the zeros and the probabilities involved. For example, consider SR4 and SR5. The two lotteries in SR5 involve probabilities of £5 and £60 which are only one quarter of the corresponding probabilities in SR4, so that the EV and the EV difference are both reduced by 75%. However, the median MSoP falls by no more than 25% and the mean MSoP is reduced by an even smaller proportion. Similar patterns can be found when comparing SR3 with SR2, SR6 with SR13, SR9 with SR12 and SR10 with SR11: in the first three comparisons, the EV differences fall by 75% or 80% but the MSoP means and medians never fall by more than 40%; and in the final comparison, the EV difference falls by 75% while the means and medians fall by between 20% and 50%.
By contrast, when respondents are later presented with straight choices where the extra £2 or £4 have already been added to all payoffs of the initially non-chosen option, it may be that they place greater weight on the probability of receiving at least some positive payoff, thereby producing a choice-matching disparity analogous to those reported by Tversky et al. (1988) .
The possibilities outlined above do not seem to us to be mutually exclusive, and nor do we claim they represent an exhaustive list of potential explanations. Further experimental designs might investigate them more thoroughly. Meanwhile, our results suggest that, for whatever reasons, the provision of incentive compatible mechanisms in conjunction with transparent elicitation procedures presented to participants with prior experience of the tasks is not sufficient to eliminate serious and seemingly systematic discrepancies between choice and equivalence procedures.
It would be interesting to explore the robustness of these findings in other settings, e.g. consumer behaviour with respect to the kinds of goods often sold in the marketplace. If the same systematic patterns are prevalent in those environments, there may be important implications for microeconomics more generally. b -Asterisks indicate significance in a two-tail Fisher exact test: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
